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RECENT DECISIONS
tween tax deed holders and other property owners to justify the shorter
statute of limitations.
In the statute enacting a longer statute of limitations for those who
'have occupied the status of tenant there is much less reason to find the
differential treatment arbitrary. The relation of landlord and tenant is
a distinct, well-recognized one, neither new nor novel.' At common law
a tenant could not set up a title against his landlord at all without first
surrendering possession.' In the absence of a statute, the general rule to-
clay is that the possession of the tenant is not deemed adverse to the land-
lord, so as to enable the tenant to acquire title by adverse possession, unless
there has been a clear repudiation of the holding under the landlord and
notice of such repudiation is brought home to the landlord." The Montana
statute takes an intermediate position, dealing with the problem in the
same way that California and New York have.' It would seem that the
legislature intended to give recognition to the important character of the
relation and to impede the claim of adverse possession by a tenant who has
continued in possession. The relation of landlord and tenant is not a
mere technical one, but implies a relation of trust and confidence which
should not be abused." The relation involves the relinquishment by the
landlord of exclusive possession and control during the term, as distin-
guished from a mere privilege or license."
The dictum in the instant case leaves the standing of the statute gov-
erning adverse possession by a tenant in serious question. The court will
undoubtedly be called upon sometime to answer the question which it has
posed. It is submitted that in view of the foregoing considerations the
court should not conclude that section 93-2512 is unconstitutional. The
classification it makes is based upon a sound traditional distinction.
ROBERT CORONTZOS
DECISION HOLDING CONTRACTION OF POLIO IS INJURY WITHIN MON-
TANA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT IS OVERTURNED BY LEGISLATUREai-
Decedent was employed as a foreman in the Helena city street department.
He frequently worked and ate at the city shops, in close proximity to city
garb-ge trucaks and the hobo Junoleq For three or four days prior to the
onset of his illness he had been doing fatiguing work in the hot sun. Three
days after he became ill, he died of bulbar polio. The Industrial Accident
Board denied his widow compensation because she failed to show that de-
'Butler v. Maney, 146 Fla. 33, 200 So. 226 (1941).
"Tewksbury v. Magraff, 33 Cal. 237 (1867).
"51 C.J.S. Lamnlord and Tenant § 282 (1947).
'See CAI. COnE Civ. PRoc. § 326; N.Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT § 41. Research has failed to
disclose any cases questioning the constitutionality of the statute in these jurisdic-
tions.
"'Ballard v. Gilbert, 55 So. 2d 723 (Fla. 1951).
"Kaypar Corp. v. Fosterport Realty Corp., 1 Misc. 2d 469, 69 N.Y.S.2d 313 (1947),
aff'd. 272 App. Div. 878, 72 N.Y.S.2d 405 (1947).
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cedent had sustained an injury arising out of and in the course of employ-
ment, resulting from some fortuitous event, as distinguished from the con-
traction of disease. The District Court reversed the order of the I.A.B.
and awarded compensation. On appeal to the Montana Supreme Court,
held, affirmed. Contraction ot polio may be an injury within the contem-
plation of the Montana Workmen's Compensation Act. Hines v. Indus-
trial Accident Board, 358 P.2d 447 (Mont. 1960) (Justice Castles and Chief
Justice Harrison dissenting).
In upholding the award, the Montana Supreme Court was faced with
two problems: first, whether the contraction of polio may be considered
an industrial injury in the face of a statute which defines injury as "re-
sulting from some fartuitos event, as duistinguished from the contraction
of disease";' and second, whether, in spite of the obscure etiology of polio,
there can be established a sufficient causal connection between the em-
ployment and the disease. It should be noted at the outset that the two
dissenting justices would have held both that the contraction of polio was
not an industrial injury, and that there was no causal connection shown
between the employment and the contraction of polio.
The concept "industrial injury" used in the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act has been the subject of much judicial interpretation in the Mon-
tana Supreme Court. Since the Act is to be given liberal construction to
accomplish its beneficent and remedial purposes,' the court's approach to
the cases has been very individualized, resulting in no precise delimitation
of the concept. The following have been termed "industrial injuries" in
Montana: heart failure resulting from varying degrees of exertion;' a
latent lung condition activated by inhalation of poisonous fumes;' heat
prostration resulting from excessive exposure in the sun;' neurosis resulting
from a fall from a scaffold;' from being hit by a piece of stone;' or from
the strain of setting a post;' arthritic condition accelerated from being
struck in the leg by a board;' Parkinson's disease accelerated by a fall;"
or caused by back and hip injuries when struck by a packing case;' men-
ingitis contracted after the claimant had suffered a fall ;" and diseased
kidneys listed as the cause of death after the workman had been almost
killed three and one half years before when a mine ceiling caved in on him,
and from which injuries he never fully recovered."
It is well-settled, therefore, that there may be compensation for a dis-
ease if the disease has been aggravated or accelerated by an injury arising
'RvimED CODES OF MONTANA 1947, § 92-418.
2REVsED CODS OF MONTANA 1947, § 92-838.
"Rathbun v. Taber Tank Lines Inc., 129 Mont. 121, 283 P.2d 966 (1955) ; Murphy
v. Anaconda Co., 133 Mont. 198, 321 P.2d 1094 (1958) ; Young v. Liberty Nat'l Ins.
Co., 357 P.2d 886 (Mont. 1960).
'Murphy v. Industrial Accident Board, 93 Mont. 1, 16 P.2d 705 (1932).
'Ryan v. Industrial Accident Board, 100 Mont. 143, 45 P.2d 775 (1935).
"Best v. London Guar. & Acc. Co., 100 Mont. 332, 47 P.2d 656 (1965).
'Sykes v. Republic Coal Co., 94 Mont. 239, 22 P.2d 157 (1933).
'O'Neil v. Industrial Accident Board, 107 Mont. 176, 81 P.2d 688 (1968).
'Birnie v. United States Gypsum Co., 134 Mont. 39, 328 P.2d 133 (1958).
'Gaffney v. Industrial Accident Board, 129 Mont. 394, 287 P.2d 256 (1955).
uMoffett v. Bozeman Canning Co., 95 Mont. 347, 26 P.2d 973 (1933).
'Williams v. Brownfield-Canty Co., 95 Mont. 364, 26 P.2d 980 (1933).
[Vol. 22,
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out of and in the course of employment," and further that the employer
takes the employee as is without any warranty as to his state of health.'
However, it must be shown that the aggravation, and not the disease as it
would otherwise affect the claimant, is a contributing cause of the dis-
ability." This is far different from allowing recovery for the initial con-
traction of disease where no "injury" is involved within the meaning of
the statutory language.
In determining that contraction of polio is an "industrial accident,"
the majority of the court relied upon this statement in another recent Mon-
tana case:'
There can be an industrial accident within the meaning of the
Workmen's Compensation Act even though there is no accident in
the ordinary sense, i.e., an act of violence whereby an employee is
struck by an object or injured by a fall.
In that case the workman was exposed to severe cold plus physical exertion
to the point of exhaustion, from which he developed arteriosclerosis. Other
cases support the view that exposure or exertion are sufficiently fortuitous
to constitute an industrial accident when it results in disability." In the
instant case the majority of the court notes that the decedent was doing
fatiguing work in the hot sun, but it does not discuss whether or not it
deems this a fortuitous event. Rather, it appears to adopt the district
court's finding that the law does not require a fortuitous event." In so
holding, the district court relied upon Murphy v. Anaconda Co., from
which it extracted an incomplete and misleading statement: "An injury
is accidental when either the cause or result is unexpected."' In Murphy
v. Anaconda Co. the supreme court actually held :'
An injury is accidental where either the cause or result is unex-
pected or accidental although the work being done is usual or
ordinary as long as the exertion is either the sole or a contributory
cause of the injury.
The court was very careful in the Murphy case to define "fortuitous event"
as a prerequisite to finding an industrial accident. '  It is submitted that
the district court fell into error by finding that the law does not require
the injury to result from some fortuitous event.
In the instant case the majority does not even discuss the express
8Tweedie v. Industrial Accident Board, 101 Mont. 256, 53 P.2d 1145 (1936).
"Nicholson v. Roundup Coal Mining Co., 79 Mont. 358, 380, 257 Pac. 270, 276 (1927);
1 LASON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 12.20 (1952).
"Birdwell v. Three Forks Portland Cement Co., 98 Mont. 483, 497, 40 P.2d 43, 47
(1935) ; 1 HONNOLD, WOnKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 98 (1918).
"Gaffney v. Industrial Accident Board, 129 Mont. 394, 404, 287 P.2d 256, 201 (1955).
"
7Young v. Liberty Nat'l Ins. Co., 357 P.2d 886,,891 (Mont. 1960).
"See, e.g., Ryan v. Industrial Accident Board, 100 Mont. 143, 45 P.2d 775 (1985)(exposure) ; Rathbun v. Taber Tank Lines Inc., 129 Mont. 121, 283 P.2d 966 (1955)
(exertion).
"Instant case at 449.
"133 Mont 198, 321 P.2d 1094 (1958).
=Instant case at 449.
"133 Mont. 198, 211, 321 P.2d 1094, 1101 (1958) (emphasis supplied).
2Id. at 206, 321 P.2d at 1099.
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statutory exclusion of contraction of disease from the Act, while Justice
Castles, in his dissent, views the statutory language as directed at precise-
ly such diseases as polio.
Having determined that the contraction of polio could be an indus-
trial accident, the majority of the court agreed with the district court that
the death of the claimant's husband was caused or contributed to by his
employment.' The dissent disagreed with the majority on this point also. '
The trial court specifically found that "No one knows exactly when,
where, how, or why a poliomyelitis victim contracts the disease.' It has
been consistently held that the burden is upon the claimant to prove an
injury resulting from (1) an industrial accident, (2) arising out of and
(3) in the course of employment, and since these terms are used conjunc-
tively and not disjunctively in the statute, all the essential elements must
be proved by the claimant by a preponderance of the evidence.' A perusal
of the record reveals that the best the claimant could show was a mere
possibility that the decedent contracted the disease while on the job. Re-
lying upon Gaffney v. Industrial Accident Board,' the trial court found a
mere possibility all that is required, ' and the majority seems to have
acquiesced in that statement of the law. There is no question that this is
an area of medical uncertainty and, to be sure, the law does not require
demonstration or such a degree of proof as produces absolute certainty. '
However, under the guise of liberal construction, the court should not lose
sight of the proposition that the Act is not framed on the theory of life in-
surance for the employees, but on that of compensation for injuries sus-
tained in the course of employment. ' Perhaps the legislature had this
area of scientific incertitude in mind when it distinguished injury from
contraction of disease.
There have been. only a few polio workmen's compensation cases from
other jurisdictions, and those allowing recovery have all related to nurses
who were exposed to polio patients in the course of their work. ' Since
none of these jurisdictions has a statutory definition of "injury" like that
of Montana, ' their holdings are of doubtful value as authority in this
"Instant case at 452.
'Id. at 454.
'Id. at 449.
27Nicholson v. Roundup Coal Mining Co., 79 Mont. 358, 374, 257 Pac. 270, 275 (1927).
'129 Mont. 394, 287 P.2d 256 (1955).
29Instant case at 449.2'Weakley v. Cook, 126 Mont. 332, 336, 249 P.2d 926, 928 (1952).
"Landeen v. Toole County Refining Co., 85 Mont. 41, 53, 277 Pac. 615, 619 (1929).
8'Industrial Commission v. Corwin Hospital, 126 Colo. 358, 250 P.2d 135 (1952);
Gardner v. New York Medical College, 280 App. Div. 844, 113 N.Y.S.2d 394 (1952),
affirmed, 111 N.E.2d 644 (N.Y. 1953) ; Los Angeles County v. Industrial Accident
Commission, 13 Cal. App. 2d 69, 56 P.2d 577 (1936) ; Wold v. Industrial Accident
Commission, 42 Cal. App. 2d 512, 109 P.2d 398 (1941), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 65W(1942). For cases denying compensation see, e.g., Children's Hospital Society v.
Industrial Accident Commission, 22 Cal. App. 2d 365, 71 P.2d 83 (1937) (nurse who
did not sustain the burden of proof) ; Travelers Ins. Co. v. Blazier, 228 S.W.2d
217 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954) (laborer) ; Standard Ace. Ins. Co. v. Nicholas, 146 F.2d
376 (5th Cir. 1944) (laborer). Cf. McAllister v. Cosmopolitan Shipping Co., 169
F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1948).
S' See REVISED CODES OF MONTANA 1947, § 92-418; N.Y. WORKMEN'S COMP. LAW § 2(7)(McKinney 1946) (injury means only accidental injuries arising out of and in the
[Vol. 22,
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state. Nonetheless the majority relied on a Colorado case as though it lent
support to its position.
It would appear that the majority of the court has invaded the legis-
lative domain in rendering this ultra-liberal decision. The only way the
majority could have reached this result, since there can be no dispute that
polio is a disease, was to ignore altogether the provisions of a relatively ex-
plicit statute. In addition it upheld a finding of causal relation upon show-
ing of a mere possibility.
In direct response to the instant case the 1961 Session of the Montana
Legislative Assembly amended R.C.M. 1947, § 92-418, to read as follows :"
"Injury" or "injured" means a tangible happening of a trau-
matic nature from an unexpected cause, resulting in either external
or internal physical harm, and such physical condition as a result
therefrom and excluding disease not traceable to injury. (Em-
phasis supplied).
This statutory declaration repudiates the instant case and narrows the
sweep of the Act, possibly excluding both exposure and exertion cases from
coverage. The liberal holding in the instant case, by precipitating this
legislative reaction has in the final analysis diminished rather than ex-
panded workmen's rights under the Act.
KENNETi R. WILSON
MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT REFERENDUM REQUIRES Ap-
PROVAL OF GOVERNOR BEFORE SUBMISSION TO ELECTORATE.-A proposed con-
stitutional amendment, passed by the Montana Legislative Assembly, would
have created a separate Board of Regents for the general control and super-
vision of the University of Montana. The proposal was not submitted to
the governor for his approval. A proceeding was brought in the Supreme
Court of Montana to restrain the secretary of state from expending public
funds to publish the proposed amendment. A temporary restraining order
issued. The Montana Supreme Court, after a hearing on the merits, made
the injunction permanent. A proposed constitutional amendment must,
under the Montana Constitution, be submitted to the governor for his ap-
proval or rejection before A ii pre ' uted Lo the people. State ex rej. Liv-
ingstone v. Murray, 354 P.2d 552 (Mont. 1960) (Justice Angstman con-
curring specially).
Relator attacked the constitutionality of the proposed amendment on
two grounds: first, that it contained two separate and distinct subjects
course of employment and such disease or infection as may naturally result there-
from) ; CoLO. REv. STAT. 1953, §§ 81-2-1 to -8 (no attempt to define Injury) ; CAL.
LAB. CoDE ANN. § 3208 (Deering 1953) (injury includes any injury or disease aris-
ing out of employment).
"Laws of Montana 1961 ch. 162.
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